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TOWARD THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE
ANTITRUST RULE OF PER SE ILLEGALITY
AS A LAW OF RULES FOR HORIZONTAL
PRICE FIXING AND TERRITORIAL
ALLOCATION AGREEMENTS:
A REFLECTION ON THE PALMER




HE application of the rule of per se illegality has been the focal
point for a long-standing debate in antitrust law. A case filed in
1985 by a class of law students at a southern law school against the
dominant marketer of bar review courses and legal publishing and one of
its competitors, which eventually reached the Supreme Court in 1990 and
was finally resolved in a 1993 settlement, provides an interesting founda-
tion to reexamine that debate.' The current economic collapse, attrib-
uted in part to deregulation to an ideological extreme, provides a timely
context.
The lower courts which heard Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc. 2 refused
to apply per se analysis to alleged horizontal price fixing and market allo-
cation as Supreme Court precedent required. 3 The Supreme Court sum-
marily reversed and re-affirmed two historic precedents for which
enthusiasm had waned in the lower courts and (in civil cases) in the Exec-
utive Branch.
Yet in the immediately following years, we see three different judicial
responses to that case. Some courts accepted it and applied it well, par-
ticularly in criminal cases. Some courts wiggled, trying to differentiate
* J.D., Harvard University; Joseph Henry Lumpkin Professor of Law (Retired),
University of Georgia School of Law.
1. See generally Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam). The
author was counsel of record for the plaintiffs/petitioners in Palmer.
2. Id.
3. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417, 1324 (1989), amended by 893 F.2d
293 (11th Cir. 1990).
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their facts to avoid using the per se rule. Other courts simply ignored or
misapplied the rule.
Prior to this drama, the Supreme Court and individual Justices had ex-
tolled per se rules as providing valuable benefit to the law. The per se
rules are based on economic experience, so they are not theoretical test
balloons. They aid the courts in efficient functioning. Their use gives
clear boundaries for businesses to act within. Perhaps most importantly
and intrinsically, they provide for the consistent administration of the
law.
Yet despite these per se rules, some lower courts have debated analysis
that seems clearly controlled by Palmer. And perhaps because of this
waffling and ambivalence, the benefits of a per se rule and the careful
considerations of the Supreme Court have been frustrated. Of course,
the deregulatory push of the Bush Administration has rendered this re-
sulting uncertainty of temporarily historical interest, but it may be time
for the pendulum to swing back toward reinvigorating the use of the per
se rule.
I. PER SE RULES HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN LAW
The question that should be asked, and has often been answered by the
Supreme Court, is: Why do we have per se violations of the Sherman
Act? We know that the per se rule has a tumultuous history, being fa-
vored roughly by the courts until the late 1970s. Before discussing the
per se rule's importance, a brief history of the development of the mod-
ern per se analysis is in order.4
In the face of an economic crisis and the Great Depression, as well as
with the imprimatur of government approval, oil companies in the late
1930s joined together to prop up oil prices and save their industry.5 De-
spite the necessity of the action to save the industry and the stamp of
government approval, the Supreme Court condemned the collaboration
as per se illegal.6 This strong message invigorated the per se rule, and the
next three decades saw an increasing usage of the rule.7
Up until 1977, when the Supreme Court decided Continental T. V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,8 the per se rule was used with relative consistency.
The Court found the locality restriction on a local television dealer did
4. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, The Future of the Per Se Rule: Two Visions at War
with One Another, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 200 (1990).
5. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil. Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-11, 219, 225-28 (1940).
6. See Id. at 225-28.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 598, 610-12 (1972)
(holding horizontal territory allocations, even for a cooperative of small stores, are per se
illegal and regaling the Sherman Act as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise"); United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (holding agreements restricting
distributors to exclusive territories are illegal per se), overruled by Cont'l T. V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 464 (1941) (holding boycott of members who used copied fashions
illegal).
8. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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not warrant the use of a per se condemnation, and Justice Powell an-
nounced that the "prevailing standard of analysis" was the "rule of rea-
son" and that the per se rule was the exception. 9
A series of cases since then have redefined the per se rule. In National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, the Society's Code of
Ethics had condemned competitive bidding and forbade any of its mem-
bers from price bidding until selected for a job. 10 The Society tried to
justify its position on the basis of safety, as cheaper bridges were inher-
ently unsafe. 1 The Supreme Court opinion condemned the ethics rule
and introduced a third category of analysis. Justice Stevens described the
first category as per se: "agreements whose nature and necessary effect
are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is
needed to establish their illegality"; 12 the second as rule of reason:
"agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing
the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed"; 13 and the third category, where the re-
straint is not per se unlawful, but the anticompetitive effect is clear and
no elaborate analysis is needed.14 The Society's ethics rule was con-
demned under the third mode of analysis. 15
Soon afterwards, two other cases refined this new era of analysis. In
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the music
industry's blanket licensing for musicians was under attack from one of
the customer networks.1 6 The language focused on the economics of the
agreement and its effect on limiting output. As the agreement allowed
for certain "efficiencies," the increased ease of monitoring the music's use
for the payment of royalties, and the view that a blanket license was a
separate product, then such licenses were not illegal.17
Five years later, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma, set forth this new "quick look" rule of reason.' 8 Such a
method did not involve a lengthy investigation of the market share or
monopoly power, but quickly balanced the anticompetitive effects with
the procompetitive effects.' 9
In a case that seemed to threaten any potency left to the per se rule,
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., a vertical agree-
ment to cut off a price discounter was held not to be within the per se
9. Id. at 37, 49-50.
10. 435 U.S. 679, 862-83 (1978). The author was a senior trial attorney in the United
States Department of Justice and worked on Professional Engineers for the Government.
11. Id. at 684-85.
12. Id. at 692.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 692-93.
16. 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979).
17. See id. at 19-22.
18. 468 U.S. 85, 115-120 (1984). The author served as counsel to the plaintiffs/respon-




illegal category unless a specified price was agreed to.20 This decision
narrowed the per se rule for vertical agreements to literal resale price
maintenance and also provided lower courts with strong ammunition with
which to avoid per se analysis in other categories, including the Palmer
district and appellate courts.
It was against this economics-induced backlash of cases that several
horizontal cases appeared. The first, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Den-
tists, dealt with dentists in a small area of Indiana who refused to send x-
rays to insurance companies and formed an ad hoc association to cement
their refusal.21 The insurance company was reviewing x-rays to ensure
that the procedures paid for were necessary or the best course.22 Under a
quick look rule of reason, the Court found that the Federation of Dentists
had acted illegally.23 The Court also stated its hesitancy to expand the
per se analysis within the area of boycotts. 24 This was not a condemna-
tion of per se rules, but it certainly made per se analysis of other horizon-
tal violations that much more suspect.
In 1990, months before Palmer, the Court reaffirmed that competitors'
agreements to withhold services for the express purpose of raising prices
(or salaries) were per se illegal. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, a group of overworked and underpaid court-appointed criminal
defense attorneys banded together to refuse to provide their services and
demand better wages. 25 While Justice Stevens, speaking for the Court,
sympathized with the "worthwhile and unpopular" cause, he still con-
demned the agreement and action as an illegal horizontal restraint of
trade and stated that "per se rules are, of course, the product of judicial
interpretations of the Sherman Act, but the rules nevertheless have the
same force and effect as any other statutory commands. '26
It was within this new-found resurgence that Palmer appeared, as well
as against a backdrop of confusion. However, per se rules not only carry
the force of "statutory command," but they are also deemed to serve four
valuable purposes: to promote economic reliability, to allow for ease of
judicial administration, to provide predictability of the law for the busi-
ness community, and, most essentially, to promote the most basic form of
justice.
A. ECONOMIC RELIABILITY
The essential nature of per se rules is that the subject matter is well
known. Courts would be unwilling to condemn something of which they
20. 485 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1988).
21. 476 U.S. 447, 451 (1986).
22. Id. at 449.
23. See id. at 463-66.
24. See id. at 458-59.
25. 493 U.S. 411, 414 (1990).
26. Id. at 421, 432-33.
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know little. And rightfully so.27 The reason to use per se rules is famili-
arity; we know that this arrangement or restraint is patently anticompeti-
tive. The Court has recognized that "[o]nce experience with a particular
kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the
rule of reason will condemn it, [the Court] has applied a conclusive pre-
sumption that the restraint is unreasonable. ' 28 It was clear in Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society that the Court was considering the type
of restraint, and not the industry restrained, when considering the
amount of judicial experience.29 Thus, a court's reasoning that the per se
rule does not apply due to lack of judicial experience with an industry is
being less than open.
B. EASE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Investigations into the anticompetitive effects of an agreement or ac-
tion are costly. It costs the parties money to hire experts and to litigate.
It involves a court's time, a jury's time, and it may be a waste of resources
if the per se rule can predict the outcome. Use of the per se rule can
avoid "the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged eco-
nomic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as
well as related industries. '30
There is a calculus that can be applied to predict when per se rules are
beneficial.
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justi-
fied on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will
far outweigh the losses and that significant administrative advantages
will result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus the
administrative costs of determining in what particular situations the
practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may
result. If the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to
this degree, then they are simply not worth identifying in individual
cases.
31
Recall Justice Stevens' definition of per se: "[P]er se rules are, of
course, the product of judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, but the
rules nevertheless have the same force and effect as any other statutory
27. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (showing that the
Supreme Court is unwilling to condemn a vertical territorial restriction as per se illegal
without more experience with the subject matter).
28. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344, 348 (1982) (finding
medical providers who fixed maximum fee schedules to be per se horizontal price fixing).
29. See id.
We are equally unpersuaded by the argument that we should not apply the
per se rule in this case because the judiciary has little antitrust experience in
the health care industry .... [T]he result of this reasoning was the adoption
by the Court of Appeals of a legal standard based on the reasonableness of
the fixed prices, an inquiry we have so often condemned.
Id. at 349-50.
30. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).




commands. '32 Once a proscribed act has been alleged and proven, per-
haps a court should not be concerned with differentiating it, as some
courts may have done with Palmer. The act has been condemned; it in-
creases the efficiency of the courts to follow it.
C. PREDICTABILITY OF THE LAW FOR THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
Clear rules are essential to the fluid functioning of society. Businesses
need to know what is allowed and what is forbidden. The grey areas may
be great for attorneys but difficult for businesses to manage within. If the
rules are clear and the definitions well-known, then businesses can act
accordingly.33
It has been noted that the rule may be clearly stated, but the definition
of "price fixing" or "market allocation" may be unclear, providing a false
guidance to businesses.34 However, if a metaphor may be drawn, where
the ice is thin, one should not skate closely.
In addition, if the court has had enough experience with a certain cate-
gory of restraints to label it per se illegal, then the experience should be
enough for a clear definition. Price fixing has been defined to be agree-
ments "'formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising"' prices or
pricing structures. 35 Market allocation also has been defined:
One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agree-
ment between competitors at the same level of the market structure
to allocate territories in order to minimize competition . . . . This
Court has reiterated time and time again that "[h]orizontal territorial
limitations ... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except
stifling of competition." Such limitations are per se violations of the
Sherman Act.36
D. JUSTICE IS SERVED BY PER SE RULES
As indicated by the language of the opinion, Justice Scalia may not
believe in the protection of competition afforded by antitrust rules,37 in-
stead preferring the language of the University of Chicago article 38 and
the protection of efficiency. However, in the article, Justice Scalia has
found that per se rules are profoundly important.39 Per se rules embody
justice, which, to Justice Scalia, means fairness. When kings were the law
and each different case was decided through the king's sensibilities, the
32. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432-33 (1990).
33. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982); see also
Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706,
710 (1983).
34. See Note, supra note 33, at 710.
35. Palmer v. BCG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48 (1990) (quoting United States v. So-
cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)).
36. Id. (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)).
37. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988).
38. See generally Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
39. Id.
[Vol. 62
A Reflection on the Palmer Case
results were often capricious and unpredictable, he writes.40 In today's
courts, he likens that kingly prerogative to the "personal discretion to do
justice" exercised by some courts.41
On the other hand, a democracy such as the United States depends on
a general rule of law, as it is fair.42 To punish one person and not another
is not equal protection, nor is it justice.
[T]he trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law
making is that it does not satisfy this sense of justice very well. When
a case is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is
important, if the system of justice is to be respected, not only that the
later case be different, but that it be seen to be so. When one is deal-
ing, as my Court often is, with issues so heartfelt that they are be-
lieved by one side or the other to be resolved by the Constitution
itself, it does not greatly appeal to one's sense of justice to say: "Well,
that earlier case had nine factors, this one has nine plus one." Much
better, even at the expense of the mild substantive distortion that
any generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated
rule that one can point to in explanation of the decision. 43
Justice Scalia draws on that sense of justice throughout the entire essay
and draws in the other three purposes for per se rules: economic reliabil-
ity, ease of judicial administration, and predictability of the law for the
business community. As the Supreme Court can review a mere speck of
the federal cases, Justice Scalia points out that anyone hoping to close in
on "a fully articulated rule of law by deciding one discrete fact situation
after another until (by process of elimination, as it were) the truly opera-
tive facts become apparent-that notion simply cannot be applied to a
court that will revisit the area in question with great infrequency. '44
Besides the inability of the Supreme Court to carve away at cases until
the law emerges, Justice Scalia also points out that a predictable or relia-
ble decision is also a just one.
Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have
the means of knowing what it proscribes .... As laws have become
more numerous, and as people have become increasingly ready to
punish their adversaries in the courts, we can less and less afford
protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may mean. Predict-
ability, or as Llewellyn put it, "reckonability," is a needful character-
istic of any law worthy of the name. There are times when even a
bad rule is better than no rule at all. 45
40. See id. at 1175-76.
41. See id. at 1176.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1178. He compares the search for the "perfect answer" to the competing
value of justice, two values of which Justice Scalia obviously thought justice to be the more
important. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1179 (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECID-
ING APPEALS 17 (Little, Brown 1960)).
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A last essential point Justice Scalia makes is to demonstrate that when
a court eschews a per se rule for the totality of the circumstances test, he
leaves law behind and becomes a finder of fact.46
To reach such a stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of de-
feat-an acknowledgement that we have passed the point where
"law," properly speaking, has any further application. And to reiter-
ate the unfortunate practical consequences of reaching such a pass
when there still remains a good deal of judgment to be applied:
equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a multi-tiered
judicial system, impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed; ju-
dicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired.47
To square his argument, Justice Scalia quotes Aristotle to say that
"'personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of
persons, should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is una-
ble, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies,
to make an exact pronouncement."' 48 In the context of the Sherman Act,
such an exact pronouncement has been often made. "As we have cor-
rectly expressed the test for per se Sherman Act illegality, it is whether
the type of conduct in question 'would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output." 49
To be fair, Justice Scalia included a disclaimer which still leaves open a
role for "totality of the circumstances" tests, but stressed the importance
of per se rules.
Lest the observations in this essay be used against me unfairly in the
future, let me call attention to what I have not said. I have not said
that legal determinations that do not reflect a general rule can be
entirely avoided. We will have totality of the circumstances tests and
balancing modes of analysis with us forever-and for my sins, I will
probably write some of the opinions that use them. All I urge is that
those modes of analysis be avoided where possible; that the Rule of
Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the ques-
tion allows; and that, to foster a correct attitude toward the matter,
we appellate judges bear in mind that when we have finally reached
the point where we can do no more than consult the totality of the
circumstances, we are acting more as fact-finders than as expositors
of the law.50
Once a per se rule has been announced, what is condemned is con-
demned with certainty. Its use is not only based on the practical benefits
such as judicial ease or predictability. Per se rules, once announced, per-
form justice and maintain fairness and equality. Both Justices Stevens
46. Id. at 1182.
47. Id. The judicial courage referred to is the courage a judge may feel in the face of
an unpopular but correct decision when he takes refuge in a per se rule; the ability to say "I
would do this, but the law is very clear."
48. Id. (quoting THE PoLrTcs OF ARISTOTLE 127 (Ernest Baker trans., Oxford 1946)).
49. Id. at 1183 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1979)).
50. Id. at 1186-87.
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and Scalia agreed that the use of per se rules should be encouraged, and
that lower courts to turning their backs to such rules disrupts both the law
and justice. 51
II. PALMER'S ROUGH RIDE
Palmer may have been a resounding reaffirmation of the per se rules
against both market allocation (Topco Associates) and horizontal price
fixing (Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.), but as it rose through the court system,
it received nothing but resistance. The baffling refusal to follow sound
precedent by both the district courts and appellate courts, with the con-
fusing and novel analysis found in those opinions, showcases the level of
resistance or misunderstanding many lower courts hold towards per se
rules in antitrust.
In the early 1980s, there were essentially two competitors for bar re-
view courses in Athens, Georgia: Bar Review Group, Inc. (BRG) and
Harcourt Brace Janovanovich Legal and Professional Publications, Inc.
(HBJ), which operated under the trade name "BAR/BRI." They had be-
come increasingly cutthroat in their pricing and were offering more live
lectures and study materials as they competed for a fixed number of law
students. 52 This price competition resulted in HBJ losing $45,000 on its
Georgia course in 1979.53 In early 1980, the Chairman of HBJ and the
owner of the BRG met in Atlanta and Chicago to discuss the problem. 54
Shortly after a series of lunches, they signed an agreement that gave the
newly created BRG of Georgia the exclusive right to use BAR/BRI
materials in Georgia, with HBJ withdrawing from Georgia.55
With the license agreement between the two competitors came a sched-
ule of "licensing fees" that gave HBJ $100 per new student and 40% of all
charges in excess of $350.56 When this license agreement was drafted, the
going rate for the bar review courses was about $150. 5 7 Immediately af-
ter the agreement was signed, posters were placed around the law school
51. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432-33 (1990)
("[P]er se rules are, of course, the product of judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act,
but the rules nevertheless have the same force and effect as any other statutory
commands.").
52. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1987) (Order Granting
Summary Judgment). The competition was described by Mr. Conviser, the Chairman of
HBJ Legal and Professional Publications, as "a grudge match between [HBJ Legal] and
Mr. Pelletier," the owner and president of Bar Review Group, Inc. Deposition of Richard
Conviser at 36-39, reprinted in Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Palmer, No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga.) (on file with author).
53. Id. at 3.
54. Deposition of Ronald 0. Pelletier at 39, 57-59, reprinted in Brief in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Palmer, No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga.) (on file
with author).
55. License Agreement between BRG of Georgia, Inc. and Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich Legal and Professional Publications, Inc. (Apr. 22, 1980) (on file with author).
56. Id.
57. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1987) (Order Granting
Summary Judgment) (on file with author).
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that proclaimed "BRG & BAR/BRI = the best of both worlds."' 58 The
posters also announced the new price for this combined course would be
over $400.
59
The vast majority of law students in Athens, Georgia subscribed to ei-
ther BRG or BAR/BRI, and they combined in a class action lawsuit to
challenge the combination of the two competitors and the rise in price.60
This first case settled, and the original license agreement was altered so
that it was no longer exclusive. 61 Despite the altered written agreement,
the price and the competitive environment did not change, and a second
class action suit was filed on November 4, 1985.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT
The complaint charged the defendants with nine counts of violating the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. The first four counts asserted violations
of section 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging a price-fixing cartel, market
allocation, boycott/concerted refusal to deal, and unreasonable joint ven-
ture. 62 The remaining counts alleged violations of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. They charged the defendants with attempting to monopolize or
conspiring to monopolize bar review service in Georgia and nationally.
They also charged the defendants with monopolization in Georgia.63
The defendants moved for summary judgment, based mostly on the
fact that the license agreement was no longer exclusive and, hence, com-
petition was not barred. The summary judgment was also based on the
fact that no specific price was mentioned.64
The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment based
on the theory of horizontal price fixing as being per se illegal. Character-
izing the defendants' actions as agreeing "to stop competing and [agree-
ing] on a method to stabilize and raise prices," the plaintiffs concluded
that such arrangements were horizontal price fixing and per se illegal.65
As support, they cited Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. ;66 National Soci-
ety of Professional Engineers v. United States;67 and United States v. So-
cony-Vacuum Oil Co. 6 8 They also cited a case with similar factual
58. Deposition of Ronald 0. Pelletier, supra note 54, at Ex. 10.
59. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1987) (Order Granting
Summary Judgment) (on file with author).
60. Id. (citing Edwards v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. 82-13-Ath (M.D. Ga. June 14, 1984)
(on file with author)).
61. See License Agreement between BRG of Georgia, Inc. and Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich Legal and Professional Publications, Inc. (Oct. 5, 1982) (on file with author).
62. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1987) (Order Granting
Summary Judgment) (on file with author).
63. Id. at 6.
64. Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Palmer, No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga.) (on file with author).
65. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Palmer, No.
C85-4377 (N.D. Ga.) (on file with author).
66. 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
67. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
68. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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circumstances, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States.69 In that case, two
newspapers agreed to stop competing in advertising and circulation,
keeping their separate identities but pooling profits.70 This was done
through a joint management agreement, as compared to the Palmer de-
fendants' license agreement.71
The court granted the defendants' summary judgment on eight of nine
counts. In a most interesting fashion, the section I claims of per se illegal-
ity were disregarded. "The court finds that the arrangement between
BRG and Harcourt does not fit within any recognized category of per se
liability." 72 While the court recognized that per se liability could occur, 73
it refused to recognize that horizontal price fixing could occur without a
specific price being agreed on.74 "While it is true that the agreement of
two competitors to 'pool' their products may exert an upward influence
on price, such an agreement is not inherently anticompetitive, and in a
given setting could actually be precompetitive. ' '75
The district court also refused to recognize that HBJ's withdrawal from
competing in Georgia in return for a share of the profits constituted mar-
ket allocation. Despite the original license agreement prohibiting compe-
tition between the two parties, both within Georgia and nationally, 76 the
court ruled that neither the original agreement nor the modified agree-
ment allocated markets.77 The basis for this ruling was that since BRG
had never competed outside of Georgia, and since HBJ had withdrawn
from Georgia, the only market that both defendants had claimed was the
state of Georgia. Since the two defendants had not carved up the state of
Georgia amongst themselves, the court ruled that there was no market
allocation between the defendants.78
The district court granted summary judgment on all counts but the
price fixing claim, deferring that ruling for thirty days. The plaintiffs were
to provide proof sufficient to survive a rule of reason test, showing an
69. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
70. Id. at 133-34.
71. See id. at 133.
72. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1987) (Order Granting
Summary Judgment) (on file with author).
73. Id. at 7. The court specifically cited four cases that illustrated "categories" of per
se liability: United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), which illustrated
price fixing; United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), which illustrated
market and customer allocation; Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941), which illustrated boycotts and concerted refusal to deal; and Citizen Publishing
Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), which illustrated unreasonable joint venture.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. The effect of this agreement certainly did have an upward pressure on price,
and the district court did acknowledge that the prices "skyrocketed" after the license
agreement. Id. at 4.
76. License Agreement between BRG of Georgia, Inc. and Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich Legal and Professional Publications, Inc. (Apr. 22, 1980) (on file with author). Sec-
tion 13 contains a covenant not to compete and section 1 grants exclusive license of BAR/
BRI materials to BRG of Georgia for courses within Georgia. Id.
77. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1987) (Order Granting




anticompetitive effect in relevant geographic and product markets. 79 To
prove an anticompetitive effect in a relevant product market, the plain-
tiffs offered evidence from the record showing that the original contract
was facially anticompetitive and that the price of the product rose precip-
itously after the contract was signed.80 Plaintiffs also provided an affida-
vit from a student who stated that where BAR/BRI had competition, in
his case the state of Washington, the prices were much lower. 81
The court dismissed any reference to the original contract, since the
modified contract deleted the offensive exclusivity terms. 82 Because
BRG had been using free materials from West Publishing up to the con-
tract date and now had to pay for those materials, the District Court at-
tributed BRG's higher prices to that new cost. The court also dismissed
the student affidavit as insignificant. Competing testimony claimed that
the prices of Washington bar review courses were nearly the lowest in all
of the forty states in which HBJ operated. This supposedly offset the
student's testimony.8 3
To prove an anticompetitive effect in a relevant geographic market, the
plaintiffs offered the expert testimony of an economist from Georgia
State University. He defined the relevant geographic market as "Athens,
Georgia during the winter academic term of law school. '84 The court
found that the area stated was too small, with the state as a whole being
more appropriate. 85
Based on this analysis, the district court granted the defendants' last
motion for summary judgment. The district court had read the facts in a
skewed, distorted fashion to find that there was no price fixing, despite a
quite obvious cause and effect relationship. It also read the facts in a
distorted fashion to find that no allocation of markets or customers had
occurred, despite a facial attempt within the initial licensing agreement to
delineate Georgia to BRG and the rest of the country to HBJ. The plain-
tiffs hoped to cure such a skewed reading of the facts by appealing to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. THE APPELLATE COURT
1. The Majority Opinion
The law students' appeal focused on the refusal by the district court to
certify the class, the failure of the district court to properly employ per se
liability for price fixing, market allocation, and conspiracy to monopolize,
and the improper application of structural tests for the horizontal price
79. Id. at 9.
80. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jul. 8, 1987) (Order Granting
Summary Judgment and Denying Motion for Reconsideration) (on file with author).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id. (quoting Dr. William Henry of Georgia State University).
85. Id. at 6.
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fixing claim.86
The appellate court responded to the appeal with a largely deaf ear,
crediting the district court as having properly employed the per se rule of
horizontal price fixing. The dissent by Judge Clarke found the district
court and the majority to be largely misstating the law.
The majority, reading Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.87 to its fullest extent, required the plaintiff to prove that the infer-
ence of conspiracy was more reasonable than the possibility of indepen-
dent action. 88 They also drew from Standard Oil Co. v. United States,8 9
requiring the plaintiff, under a per se theory of liability, to prove the de-
fendant had an anticompetitive effect in both relevant geographic and
product markets. 90
Simply repeating the district court's flawed analysis, the appellate deci-
sion found that BRG's and HBJ's conduct did not fit into any pigeonhole
category for per se liability. The appellate court accepted the defendants'
claim that the license agreement created a vertical supplier-retailer rela-
tionship, which did not require a per se analysis. 91 In fact, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that "[t]he district court's analyses of these issues are thor-
ough and legally sound." 92
Based on the district court's findings, the appellate court agreed that
the license agreement did not state a specified price and, therefore, was
not per se price fixing. The court even cited Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.93 for
this, despite the fact that Socony broadly condemned any tampering with
price structures. 94
It also agreed with the district court that this was not per se market
allocation, finding that HBJ and BRG were not horizontal competitors
and that "the agreement [was] not a 'naked agreement' between competi-
tors to allocate the market."95 The Eleventh Circuit also echoed the dis-
trict court, finding that since BRG and HBJ had not divided a market in
which both had done business, namely Georgia, there was no market allo-
cation to even consider. 96 The court held that two businesses that, prior
to the agreement, were tooth-and-tooth, blood-drawing competitors were
not horizontal competitors. 97
86. Brief for Appellants, Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. 87-8804 (11th Cir. Feb. 2,
1988) (on file with author).
87. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
88. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417, 1422 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 46(1990).
89. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
90. Palmer, 874 F.2d at 1422-23.
91. Id. at 1424.
92. Id. at 1423-24.
93. Id. at 1424.







Judge Clarke roundly dissented. His first point of contention was with
the majority's reading of Matsushita. While this opinion occurred before
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,98 Judge Clarke lim-
ited Matsushita's pro-defendant holding to its facts: "Both Matsushita and
Monsanto presented the Court with the difficult task of defining the
proper evidentiary standard for determining under what factual circum-
stances an illegal antitrust conspiracy may be inferred from parallel con-
duct and other circumstantial evidence where direct evidence of
conspiracy is lacking." 9 9
Judge Clarke continued: "Both Matsushita and Monsanto, however, are
distinguishable from the instant action. Neither case involved a consumer
action based upon well-established horizontal per se and rule of reason
theories where direct evidence establishes an explicit written agreement
between two competitors allocating markets and interfering with inde-
pendent price setting."10 0 Rather than being blind to the reality of the
agreement between BRG and HBJ, Judge Clarke correctly read Matsu-
shita to be inapt to cases that present direct evidence of an agreement.
He further recognized the license agreement to be direct evidence of an
agreement to allocate markets and fix prices. 10 1 From this factual revela-
tion, Judge Clarke was able to make three important points: that HBJ
and BRG were horizontal competitors, that market allocation had oc-
curred that was per se illegal, and that price fixing had occurred that was
per se illegal.
HBJ and BRG of Georgia had argued that by HBJ's withdrawal from
Georgia, the relationship shifted from that of horizontal competitors to a
vertical supplier/retailer relationship.1 0 2 While that argument convinced
the district court and the Eleventh Circuit majority, Judge Clarke found
that argument to be "disingenuous and meritless.' 0 3 He saw the two bar
review companies as at least potential competitors, which the license
agreement alone barred from actual competition.10 4 He feared the ma-
jority's rule would nullify the per se rule, since potential competitors
could cloak their illegal agreement as being a vertical contract and escape
antitrust liability.1 0 5 "Instead, a court must view an arrangement's eco-
98. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
99. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 874 F.2d 1417, 1431 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498
U.S. 46 (1990) (Clarke, J., dissenting) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 494 (1989)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1432 ("The district court's analysis of the plaintiffs' per se claims is contrary
to well-established antitrust case law. Under binding Supreme Court precedent, the 1980
agreement between HBJ and BRG falls within one of two recognized per se categories:




104. Id. at 1432-33.
105. Id. at 1433.
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nomic substance rather than its form. '10 6
Since the two former competitors could now be seen for the con-
strained competitors they really were, the other two points Judge Clarke
made were easily reached. He cited Topco Associates as "[w]ell-estab-
lished case law" that makes allocation of markets or sub-markets by com-
petitors per se illegal. 10 7 Though the majority and the district court
required per se unlawful market allocation to involve competitors having
previously competed within the same market, Judge Clarke found no ba-
sis in law for that requirement.108 The dissent further stated that BRG
and HBJ "[e]ach agreed not to compete in the other's respective mar-
ket."109 Judge Clarke would have labeled that agreement as per se un-
lawful market allocation.110
Judge Clarke also saw the agreement as per se unlawful price fixing,
unconvinced by the argument that since no price had been specified in
the license agreement, it did not fit within the per se illegal category."'
Citing Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Judge Clarke found clear law that made
even indirect effects on pricing illegal.'1 2 He found further indirect ef-
fects, such as agreements on the granting of credit 1 3 and agreements not
to bid competitively,"1 4 that had been condemned as illegal.
In contrast with those indirect effects, the dissent characterized the
BRG-HBJ agreement as having a directly inflationary effect on prices."15
In order for any revenue sharing to begin, the price had to be above $350,
a price far above the price of a bar review course when the agreement
was entered into."16 The agreement also facially eliminated any incentive
to compete: any competition would reduce the revenue resulting from the
license agreement, while HBJ could not even compete using its own
materials, as they had been exclusively licensed to BRG. 117 This agree-
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)).
108. Id. at 1434. In Topco Associates, a cooperative of small grocery stores had allo-
cated territories among its members to prevent competition on the cooperative store
brands. Judge Clarke pointed out that "[t]he defendants in Topco did not divide a market
in which they had previously competed; they simply agreed to allocate markets." Id. Mar-





112. Id. at 1434-35. "[U]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a com-
modity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Id. (quoting United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)).
113. Id. at 1434 n.21 (citing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980)
(finding an agreement between beer wholesalers to not grant credit indirectly affects price
and is thus illegal per se)).
114. Id. (citing Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(holding an agreement by an association that prevents its members from bidding competi-
tively is illegal on its face)).





ment was, in Judge Clarke's eyes, more direct than those indirect cases
cited and was equally prohibited.
Mindful of the cases that gave a procompetitive defense to otherwise
illegal horizontal price agreements, Judge Clarke examined whether any
defense existed.118
He found no evidence of any efficiency-creating, procompetitive poten-
tial in the agreement at all.119 He saw no need for the two bar review
courses to be combined to provide services in Georgia, especially as they
had competed for some time prior to the agreement.12 0 The only result of
the agreement he could see was a rise in price and injury to the customer,
a result "the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. ' '1 21
3. The Petition for Rehearing
The district court and Eleventh Circuit had largely ignored the well
understood legal analysis that Judge Clarke described. Based on that dis-
sent, and bolstered by an amicus brief from the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, the law students petitioned for a rehearing and suggested a rehearing
in banc. 122 While the petition was denied,1 23 the Justice Department's
amicus brief was a strong statement about the importance of per se rules
in general and the importance of per se rules on market allocation. The
brief limited itself to correctly stating the per se rule for market alloca-
tion, reacting to the Eleventh Circuit's requirement of a market previ-
ously competed within.
The amicus brief stressed that the "per se rule serves important policy
purposes."' 2 4 It serves these purposes by streamlining litigation and
making antitrust enforcement more effective, while further making the
law more predictable, and thus contributing to economic stability.125
In this case, the brief argued, the agreement between BRG and HBJ
was a naked agreement not to compete, and the Eleventh Circuit's analy-
118. Id. at 1435 & n.22 (citing two cases that presented a precompetitive defense for
horizontal agreements affecting price: NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of University of
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (holding that if college football was to be available at
all as a product, certain constraints were needed; hence the agreements on revenue were
subject to a "quick look" rule of reason) and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1979) (finding that a broad music license for many
different artists constituted a separate product that required monitoring of the licenses that
single artists couldn't do by themselves, while artists could still separately license their
music; thus the license agreement was not unlawful)).
119. Id. at 1435.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 893 F.2d 293, 293 (11th Cir. 1990).
123. Id.
124. Memorandum of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Suggestion of Rehearing en Banc, Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., No. 87-8804 (11th Cir. Jan.
27, 1990) (on file with author).
125. Id. at 3-4 (citing Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958),
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), for these two policies of business certainty and
litigation efficiency).
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sis that a market previously competed within must be divided among the
former competitors was in error. "However the parties divided up the
United States, they agreed not to compete. The Supreme Court has
found territorial market division to be a per se offense without reference
to whether markets were split among actual competitors. ' 126
Despite this strong amicus brief, the Eleventh Circuit merely added
two points to address the amicus brief. First, it restated that this was not
a naked agreement between competitors to allocate markets, as the ami-
cus brief defined the agreement.1 27 Second, it restated that HBJ and
BRG were not horizontal competitors and that no evidence had been
produced to the contrary.1 28 It then succinctly denied the petition, 29
paving for the law students a path to the Supreme Court.
C. THE SUPREME COURT
There were two glaring errors that were presented to the Supreme
Court, both involving the per se rule. The first error was in requiring that
per se illegal price fixing agreements must specify a price.130 The second
was the misstatement that in order to employ the per se rule for market
allocation, the two competitors must divide a market in which both are
competing.13' After summarizing the facts of the case, the Supreme
Court summarily reversed the Eleventh Circuit on both errors.132
1. Per se illegal horizontal price fixing
Based on Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the Court held
The revenue-sharing formula in the 1980 agreement between BRG
and HBJ, coupled with the price increase that took place immedi-
ately after the parties agreed to cease competing with each other in
1980, indicates that this agreement was "'formed for the purpose and
with the effect of raising"' the price of the bar review course.1 33
The Supreme Court then stated that it was "plainly incorrect for the Dis-
trict Court to enter summary judgment in [BRG's] favor.' 34
126. Id. at 5 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).
127. Palmer, 893 F.2d at 293.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1990) (per curiam).
131. Id. at 49.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 48-49 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil. Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940)).
134. Id. at 49 & n.5 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
("The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.")).
2009]
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2. Per se illegal market allocation
The Court, with equal dispatch, summarily reversed the appellate
court's erroneous market allocation test. Quoting heavily from United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., the Court emphasized that:
One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agree-
ment between competitors at the same level of the market structure
to allocate territories in order to minimize competition. . . . This
Court has reiterated time and time again that "horizontal territorial
limitations ... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except
stifling of competition." Such limitations are per se violations of the
Sherman Act.135
In response to the district court and Eleventh Circuit adding the re-
quirement that the market must be one in which both competitors have
previously competed for the per se rule to be employed, the Supreme
Court simply said:
Each agreed not to compete in the other's territories. Such agree-
ments are anticompetitive regardless of whether the parties split a
market within which both do business or whether they merely re-
serve one market for one and another for the other. Thus, the 1980
agreement between HBJ and BRG was unlawful on its face. 136
In one fell motion, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and summa-
rily reversed the Eleventh Circuit.137 The decision reinvigorated the use
of per se rules and in its language a sense of impatience can be seen. The
case demonstrates two similar per se rules, both of which required the
Court to look past the written agreement to the economic reality. In both
instances, where the district and appellate courts failed to do so, the Su-
preme Court shortly and clearly reversed. This sends a strong message
from the Supreme Court about the importance of these two per se rules,
but to an audience that may not be heeding.
III. LOWER COURTS' RESPONSE TO PALMER'S PER SE
RULE REVIVAL
It is almost axiomatic that a Supreme Court ruling can live or die based
on its acceptance by the lower courts. This is not the case, however, for
the per se rule. Time and time again, the per se rule has been chipped
away, only to be re-pronounced by the Supreme Court. 138 This most re-
135. Id. at 49 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)).
136. Id. at 49-50.
137. Id. at 50. Justice Marshall dissented, but only to protest the use of summary rever-
sals. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). He agreed that the limited facts indicated the Court
of Appeals was in error, but felt uncomfortable with making final decisions on a limited
record. Id.
138. Id. at 48 "This Court has reiterated time and time again that horizontal territorial
limitations ... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competi-
tion." (quoting Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 6).
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cent reassertion of the per se rule has shown signs of resistance, accept-
ance, and ignorance.
A survey of the post-Palmer cases that involve either horizontal price
fixing, horizontal market allocation, or both revealed three major pat-
terns of reception by the federal district and appellate courts. The first is
a simple acceptance of the rule, accurately restating the holdings and ap-
plying them. Strangely enough, the clear majority of these cases are in
the Seventh Circuit, home of both the Chicago School of Economics and
Judge Posner.
The second pattern is for the court to differentiate the facts, sometimes
straining to do so. Often the court labels a clearly horizontal agreement
as vertical or as a nonprice restraint. This allows a circumvention of the
per se rule and the use of the rule of reason. While the factual record is
not before this author, and there may be good reason for the differentia-
tion, the short shrift given to the per se rule and Palmer seems
unwarranted.
The last pattern is the most outrageous, for the courts either do not cite
Palmer as controlling precedent, do not mention Palmer, or wrongly cite
its findings. Several courts cite the summarily reversed Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decision. Whether this is due to a conscious effort or to
carelessness, this Article does not presume to address.
A. ACCEPTANCE OF THE RULE
A horizontal price fixing or market allocation action brought in Illinois
would appear to have the best chance of being evaluated with the Palmer
per se rule. Of the four cases that straightforwardly cite Palmer, three
were decided by the Seventh Circuit or an Illinois district court. The
fourth was decided in Pennsylvania.
1) In Burns v. Cover Studios, Inc., a school district had an exclusive
arrangement with a commercial photographer for its yearbook photos. 139
Another photographer sued, claiming that such an arrangement consti-
tuted horizontal price fixing, among other charges. 140 The court found
that the horizontal price fixing claim was without merit but analyzed the
case under Palmer's per se test.141 The court found that, as there was no
evidence presented at all to indicate that the plaintiff could not bid on the
annual contract or otherwise provide services, there was no price fix-
ing.142 The plaintiff simply and conclusorily stated that the defendant had
"cornered the market" without offering any supporting evidence. 143
2) In another case with substantially more evidence involved, two in-
139. 818 F. Supp. 888, 889-90 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
140. Id. at 890-91. The plaintiff also alleged an attempt to monopolize and illegal tying.
Id. at 891.





surance companies merged when one encountered financial problems. 144
In doing so, the failing company's policies had to be canceled. 145 In
Garot Anderson Agencies, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wisconsin,
the plaintiff alleged that the way the insureds and the agents were in-
formed of the failing company's cancellations ensured that the new com-
pany would gain the canceled policies. 146 In essence, as one competitor
was mailing out cancellation letters, the other was mailing out notices of
the merger, making it appear as though the customers should stay with
the new company. 147
On the plaintiff's claim of horizontal territorial agreement, the defen-
dant tried to differentiate Palmer. The defendant "argue[d] that, unlike
in Palmer, there is no evidence that Blue Cross and Health Care agreed
to completely remove themselves from each other's territory.' 1 48 The
court found that argument unpersuasive and cited Topco to show that the
difference between co-extensive territories and exclusive territories was
not germane to the per se rule. 149 The fact that Blue Cross continued to
sell insurance from across state lines also did not matter, as "[u]nder this
doctrine, a court is unconcerned with the potential anticompetitive effects
of an agreement, once it is found that the per se rule applies.' 150
The district court found that "[tIhe thrust of the Supreme Court's rea-
soning [in Palmer] is the agreement's anticompetitive effect on a mar-
ket."'1 51 With that in mind, the court found that the market withdrawal
agreement was facially unlawful and relied on Palmer to condemn it
under a per se analysis. 152
3) The Seventh Circuit has had more than its share of these cases, the
first of which involved a horizontal agreement to exclude a price dis-
counter from a major boat show: Denny's Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Produc-
tions, Inc. 153 The plaintiff would attend the show as a dealer, encouraging
customers to shop around and then come back for a lower price.154 The
other dealers complained, and the boat show producer informed the
plaintiff that it could not longer participate in the show. 155
144. Garot Anderson Agencies, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., No.
88-C-20255, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3446, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 1993).
145. Id. at *34.
146. See id. at *4.
147. Id. at *34.
148. Id. at *34.
149. Id. at *34-35 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 605, 608
(1972) (holding agreement where small grocers allocated territories to protect their com-
mon, cooperative store brand from price competition to be per se illegal)).
150. Id. at *37.
151. Id. at *39.
152. Id. at *40. The court recounts that Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Topco
have cast an uncertain light on that case's holding; however, it states that Palmer quoted
Topco with approval. Id. The court tried to cover its bases by analyzing the agreement
under a "quick look" rule of reason, also finding the agreement illegal under that analysis.
Id. at *40-41.
153. 8 F.3d 1217, 1219 (7th Cir. 1993).
154. Id. at 1220.
155. Id.
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After deciding that the agreement was horizontal, the court cited
Palmer for the holding that specific prices need not be agreed on for a
price fixing conspiracy to exist. 156 It also cited Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. in
condemning horizontal price-fixing agreements using a per se test.157
The defendant attempted to justify the exclusion from the show as a
"unilateral" attempt to protect other dealers from the plaintiff's "free-
riding.' 158 The court found that there was too much evidence of a con-
spiracy to accept that argument. 159 However, the district court commit-
ted error by not applying the per se analysis, and instead requiring the
plaintiff to show an adverse impact on competition in the relevant mar-
ket.1 60 The Seventh Circuit found that such a rule of reason analysis was
not at all appropriate as it "would effectively require plaintiffs to make a
rule of reason demonstration in order to invoke the per se rule! '1 61 The
court found that the exclusion from the boat show was per se illegal price
fixing, reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment and re-
manding the case for a trial on damages.1 62
4) In yet another Seventh Circuit case, Hammes v. AAMCO Transmis-
sions, Inc.,163 Chief Judge Posner dealt with several antitrust issues. In
Indianapolis the phone book listed ten AAMCO dealers where, in fact,
five existed.1 64 The "ghost dealers" were routed to a call-forwarding sys-
tem.165 A new dealer who offered competition to the existing dealers was
denied admission to this phone pool, as a result getting far fewer calls
than the other dealers. 66
The district court had dismissed the suit on the ground that the com-
plaint did not allege that interstate commerce was affected.' 67 Reversing
that finding, Chief Judge Posner also addressed the substance of the case
in dictum. He warned that if the purpose of the call-forwarding scheme
was to allocate territory within the Indianapolis market, then under
Palmer such a scheme would be per se illegal market allocation. 168
156. Id. at 1221.
157. Id. (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)).
158. Id. at 1221 n.5.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1221.
161. Id. at 1221 n.7.
162. Id. at 1222.
163. 33 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 1994).




168. Id. at 782. Chief Judge Posner supposed that the scheme may have allocated those
customers equidistant between existing dealers. Id. Where customers on the borders be-
tween the existing dealers would go to the closest dealer, the call-forwarding tricked those
customers into thinking one dealer was closer than another. Id. In this way, Chief Judge
Posner continued, price competition would be lessened. Id. He cautioned that this was




This category is, by its nature, the most difficult to assess. Courts that
have access to the evidence and differentiate their case from Palmer, thus
avoiding the per se rule, may be exercising proper judicial restraint. They
may also be twisting the facts to avoid using the per se rule-a situation
that does not seem so farfetched in light of the difficulties the lower
courts imposed in Palmer.
Without commenting much on the cases' outcomes, many of the courts
may be differentiating their cases in several ways. They may differentiate
their cases as non-price vertical restraints that are evaluated by a rule of
reason. They may simply state that the facts do not warrant a per se
analysis. The background of Supreme Court cases that introduced a
"quick look" rule of reason have also been a source for some courts to
narrowly interpret Palmer.'69
1) The earliest case to cite Palmer yet not apply the per se rule, was
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball
Ass'n.170 In that case, the National Basketball Association (NBA) had
limited the number of games available for broadcast by cable "supersta-
tions.' 171 A superstation is a local broadcast station that rebroadcasts via
satellite to cable TV systems throughout the country. 172 Examples are
WTBS in Atlanta, WWOR in New York, and the station in question,
WGN TV in Chicago.' 73 The district court stated that the reduction in
games allowed to be broadcast "results in a significant restraint on
trade."'174
However, when the plaintiffs suggested that Topco and Palmer should
be followed for analyzing such a horizontal agreement, condemning it
under a per se test, the district court balked: "[Palmer] recently confirmed
that per se condemnation of horizontal agreements is still sometimes ap-
propriate .... Some horizontal restraints may still be branded illegal per
se, as Palmer, shows, but the NBA's 5-game reduction is not one of
them."175
The similarity between the facts of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, 76 where college football teams were restricted
169. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (hold-
ing that if college football was to be available at all as a product, certain constraints were
needed; hence the agreements on revenue were subject to a "quick look" rule of reason);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1979) (finding that a
broad music license for many different artists constituted a separate product that required
monitoring of the licenses that single artists couldn't do by themselves, while artists could
still separately license their music; thus the license agreement was not unlawful). Both of
these cases presented a precompetitive defense for horizontal agreements affecting price.
170. 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Il1. 1991).
171. Id. at 1338.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1357.
175. Id. (citation omitted).
176. 468 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1984).
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in their television coverage and payments made by the NCAA, and this
case provided too much gravitational pull for the court to use the per se
rule. However, the court mistakenly cites Palmer for naked restraints be-
ing "condemned after a quick look. ' 177 It went further, finding that "a
quick look here does not yield any absolute conclusions about the proba-
ble impact of the 5-game reduction.' 1 78 Yet, under a rule of reason anal-
ysis, the district court found that the reduction in games negatively
impacted competition with the sole purpose of increasing the price of
those games and as such was illegal. 179
On appeal in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National
Basketball Ass'n,18 0 Judge Easterbrook also mentioned Palmer as con-
demning agreements between rivals to fix prices.18 1 He also stated that
those same two rivals could merge into a single entity with "little ado." 18 2
Recognizing that the characterization of the agreement, upon which the
mode of analysis turns, "is a creative rather than exact endeavor," Judge
Easterbrook deferred to the district court's ruling.1 83
2) A recent case that also took place in Illinois, Panache Broadcasting
of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Richardson Electronics, Ltd., involved a joint ven-
ture between two competitors who manufactured and distributed high-
power electron tubes for radio stations, increasing prices and reducing
competition.1 84 The joint venture, VASCO, was the exclusive distributor
for tubes of both manufacturers, with prices set by a management com-
mittee staffed by both manufacturers. 185 After VASCO was disbanded,
the manufacturers agreed not to compete on certain restricted ac-
counts. 186 In earlier proceedings, the district court, adopting the magis-
trate's report and recommendation, dismissed the horizontal price fixing
claim with prejudice, finding that the claim had not been adequately
pleaded.' 87 The magistrate found that the agreement impermissibly allo-
cated customers but that the pleadings were faulty, and so allowed the
plaintiffs to amend their pleadings.188 These findings only affected the
per se claims, and the claims based on a rule of reason analysis were al-
177. Chicago Profl Sports, 754 F. Supp. at 1357.
178. Id. at 1358.
179. Id. at 1364. The rule of reason was rather truncated, including no formal structural
analysis of the market. See id. at 1357-62. It resembled a long, "quick look" rule of reason.
The court seemed to treat the NBA less as a cartel and more as a joint venture.
180. 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
181. Id. at 671
182. Id.
183. Id. at 672, 677. He did state that the free-rider argument presented by the NBA
was worth looking at, but that the trial had been complete enough so as not to disturb the
ruling. Id. at 674, 677.
184. No. 90-C-6400, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4830, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 1994).
185. Id. at *13-15.
186. Id. at *28-29.
187. Panache Broad. of Pa., Inc. v. Richardson Elecs., Ltd, No. 90-C-6400, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1729, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1993), adopting, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4830, at
*7.
188. Panache Broad, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4830, at *7-8.
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lowed to continue.18 9
Citing Palmer, the magistrate evaluated the market allocation claim
under the per se rule of reason, finding the agreements not to compete
for certain future accounts were not per se rule violations. 190 "[T]his
court is unwilling to conclude that provisions contemplating future con-
duct themselves make out a per se claim.' 91
After reviewing a rule of reason analysis that demonstrated anticompe-
titive effects, the court re-cited Palmer to support the plaintiff's claim that
acquisitions by one of the manufacturers of the other's competing prod-
uct lines lessened output, and thus the claim was able to survive a motion
to dismiss. 192
The price fixing claim was revived as well, if only briefly. 193 Palmer
was cited to support the argument that agreements for the purpose and
with the effect of raising prices can survive summary judgment. 194 The
magistrate allowed the rule of reason claim to withstand a motion to dis-
miss, but after an elaborate revival of the per se claim, did nothing with it
and, in fact, snuffed it out.195 Strangely, Palmer was cited correctly and in
detail, and the most potent and obvious claim of horizontal price fixing
was revived but then ignored. The magistrate made no attempt to differ-
entiate the per se claim, but simply left the claim open for rule of reason
analysis.
3) Another case in which the court differentiates Palmer, and likely
with good reason, is Blackburn v. Sweeney.196 After a law partnership
dissolved, a written agreement was entered into restricting the former
partners from advertising against each other, and the agreement was im-
mediately challenged under the Sherman Act by those same lawyers.' 97
An exacerbated judge, weary of the discovery abuses conducted by both
parties, was unwilling to give much latitude to either party.198 In re-
sponse to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment based on the mar-
ket allocation per se rule cited in Palmer, the court accepted the rule and
Palmer's authority.199 However, the judge noted that both Palmer and
Topco were "light years away from this factual setting. ' 200 In fact, the
189. Id. at *8-9.
190. Id. at *25-30.
191. Id. at *30.
192. Id. at *39-41.
193. The prior ruling by the court had addressed a horizontal price fixing claim, but it
had analyzed it as a vertical resale price maintenance case. Id. at *48. Thus, the court
stated that the dismissal with prejudice of the horizontal claim only precluded a claim of
resale price maintenance. Id. at *49. Despite this revival, the court did not mention any
per se claims, and it completes its analysis under a rule of reason. See id. at *50.
194. Id. at *49-50. The court made no mention of Palmer's per se rule holding, despite
the court reviving the per se claim for horizontal price fixing in the previous paragraph.
See id.
195. See id. at *48-50.
196. 850 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
197. Id. at 759, 652.
198. Id. at 760.
199. See id. at 763.
200. Id.
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court was "totally confident that this case [was] not a per se violation
case." 201 The court was not even sure if the rule of reason could divine
any antitrust violation.202
The facts were so distant to this judge because the agreement was to
restrict attorney advertising, a goal the judge was in hearty agreement
with.203 He saw no linkage between attorney advertising restricted to a
specified city and horizontal allocation of territories with allocation of
market territory.204 As there was no price agreement contained within
the advertising agreement, he also did not see Palmer as relevant.20 5 "It
takes an extremely large jump in logic, as well as in law, to conclude from
the agreed restrictions on advertisements to an agreement to allocate
market territory. '20 6
Although the court may have accepted Palmer, it did not analyze the
case under Palmer. Palmer stands for the per se rule applying to agree-
ments that do not specify prices but are "formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising" prices. 207 As such, the court here failed to investi-
gate why this agreement to restrict advertising took place in order to de-
cide if it had the purpose or effect of raising prices. Instead, the court just
summarily stated that the facts are dissimilar.
C. IGNORANCE OF THE RULE
This last category of the surveyed cases includes the most obvious re-
buttals of Palmer, as the facts dictate its citation but it is not mentioned.
In many instances, the Supreme Court case has been ignored in favor of
the summarily reversed Eleventh Circuit opinion. It is hard to think of a
reason why a court would so handily ignore a recent Supreme Court rul-
ing, other than possibly to further a political agenda.
1) In Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., subcontractors pro-
vided a certain unique and patented adhesive for use in space shuttle
rockets.20 8 The adhesive was the only material approved for the rockets,
and the patent-holder and manufacturers were also a dual-distributor,
often bidding against a handful of its own distributors. 20 9 The manufac-
turer, wanting to keep the major accounts for itself, often told the plain-
tiff distributor not to bid on the space shuttle contract. 210 When the
plaintiff continued to not only bid, but also undercut the bids of the man-
ufacturer-distributor, the manufacturer terminated the distributor
agreement. 211
201. Id. at 764.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 762-63.
204. Id. at 763.
205. See id. at 763-64.
206. Id. at 763.
207. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990).
208. 808 F. Supp. 1503, 1507 (D. Colo. 1992).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1507-09.
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The plaintiff brought section 1 market allocation and price-fixing
claims, as well as conspiracy to monopolize, attempted monopolization,
and monopolization claims.212 Without mentioning Palmer, but relying
loosely on Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,213 the court dis-
cussed the categories accepted for per se violations.214 It then denied the
per se price-fixing claim, stating that the plaintiff had not proven the rele-
vant market.215 It simply found that one product (the adhesive) sold to
one customer (the NASA contractor) could not be a relevant market,2 16
despite the fact that the adhesive was the only substance approved and
was regularly bid on by the subcontractors. 217
One of the important holdings of Palmer was that, in a price-fixing
claim, it was irrelevant whether a specific price was agreed to or fixed.
As long as the agreement was "formed for the purpose and with the ef-
fect of raising" prices, then the agreement was illegal per se.218 The dis-
trict court accepted as true evidence that the defendant told the plaintiff
not to discount, both orally and in writing.219 The court also accepted as
true that the defendant told the plaintiff that it "had no business" bidding
for the NASA contractor's business. 220 Accepting that evidence, the
court found it crucial that the defendant had not specified any price to be
fixed and that the plaintiff was unable to "prove any contract or agree-
ment on price. '22 1 The court thus denied the per se claim.22 2
The market allocation claim was treated equally. The manufacturer
was not only the sole manufacturer, but also a major distributor that bid
against the other distributor for contracts. Yet, the court treated the case
not as a horizontal market allocation conspiracy, but as a vertical non-
price restraint. 223 Accordingly, the court denied the per se market alloca-
tion claim.22 4
"At best, plaintiff has produced some evidence of agreement to set
nonprice restrictions-payment terms. However, agreement to set non-
price restriction [sic] are subject to the rule of reason. '225 Not only did
the court ignore Palmer, but it also ignored Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,
212. Id. at 1508.
213. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
214. Smalley & Co., 808 F. Supp. at 1508. The court found that here the plaintiff had
alleged two of these categories: price fixing and horizontal market allocation. Id.
215. Id. at 1506.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1507.
218. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990).
219. Smalley & Co., 808 F. Supp. at 1509.
220. Id. at 1507, 1509.
221. Id. at 1509.
222. Id. at 1510.
223. Id. The district court cited circuit precedent for the treating of dual distributors as
vertical restrainers. Id. (citing Dart Indus., Inc. v. Plunkett Co. of Okla., Inc., 704 F.2d 496,
499 (10th Cir. 1983)). The court also cited Department of Justice guidelines for support,
stating that too often vertical restraints are too easily called horizontal restraints. ld. (cit-
ing Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263, 6265 (Feb. 14, 1985)).
224. Id. at 1511.
225. Id. (citing Monsanto v. Spray-Ryte Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760 (1984)).
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Inc.,226 where credit terms restrictions were considered price restrictions.
The court, reviewing the claim under the rule of reason, dismissed the
claim.2 27 This is but one example of a court ignoring controlling prece-
dent in order to avoid the proper per se evaluation of an antitrust case.
Unfortunately, the survey revealed an even more flagrant case.
2) In a criminal bid rigging case, United States v. Reicher, a jury con-
victed a contractor who arranged to have a friend supply a fraudulently
high bid.22 8 In fact, the defendant filled out the bid proposal, which his
friend then signed.229 Despite the jury conviction, the judge set aside the
jury's verdict and dismissed the case with prejudice. 230
The court reasoned that because, as the second bidder, the contractor
was truly unable to build the building, he was neither a competitor nor a
potential competitor.2 31 "By this, I mean that neither was a competitor in
the relevant market. Although a charge of per se violation of the Sher-
man Act proscribes inquiry into competitive effects, 'it does not excuse
identification of the relevant markets."' 232
In support of this conclusion, the court described per se rules as "ap-
propriate 'for conduct which is manifestly anticompetitive"' stating that
they "'should be invoked when surrounding circumstances make the like-
lihood of the anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified
further examination of the challenged conduct."' 233 Remarkably, this is a
quote from the summarily reversed Eleventh Circuit Palmer opinion.
Without so much as discussing the most current Supreme Court opinion
on per se market allocation, the district court set aside the jury verdict.234
226. 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (finding an agreement between beer wholesalers not to grant
credit indirectly affects price and is thus illegal per se).
227. Smalley & Co., 808 F. Supp. at 1511.
228. 777 F. Supp. 901, 902 (D.N.M. 1991). Just prior to the bids being closed, Reicher
had discovered that his was the only bid to build a special building for use in the weapons
testing grounds. Id. He knew that if only one bid was entered, the project would be can-
celed. Id. He convinced a friend in Utah, who was on the bid list but unable to actually
build the building, to submit a higher bid. Id.
229. Id. at 902-03.
230. Id. at 906.
231. Id. at 903-04. In a peculiar display of circular logic, the court cited Socony-Vac-
uum. Id. at 905 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59
(1940)). That cite supports the principle that a non-competitor may be guilty of conspiring
if still unable to commit the objective offense. Id. The court also cited United States v.
Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 728 F.2d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 1984), for the principle that a
non-competitor can violate section 1 of the Sherman Act by participating in bid rigging.
Id. Yet, the court then states that since the second bidder was not a competitor, "it is
impossible to join a conspiracy that does not exist." Id.
232. Id. at 904 (quoting United States v. Sargent Elec. Co., 785 F.2d 1123, 1127 (3d Cir.
1986)).
233. Id. at 906 (quoting Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417, 1432 n.13 (11th Cir.
1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted)).
234. Two other cases that do not involve horizontal restraints and per se analysis still
cite the Eleventh Circuit opinion without mention of the Supreme Court opinion. Davis v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., No. 89-2839-CIV-NESBITT, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20033, at *2, *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 1993), involved a phone service that the Public
Service Commission ordered unbundled from the basic services, which Southern Bell did
in an allegedly misleading way. In evaluating a section 2 claim, the court cites Palmer's
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It is clear that a few courts are willing to ignore controlling Supreme
Court precedent, such as Palmer, in order to avoid per se analysis. What
is unclear is the reason courts do this or try to differentiate their cases.
Whether it is out of confusion of the law or a genuine ulterior, politically-
motivated purpose is unknown. However, the Supreme Court Justices,
speaking both together and individually, have found per se rules to be
extremely important. It seems that other courts do not share their
view.2
35
IV. ARE LOWER COURTS HONESTLY DEBATING THE
GROUNDS OF THE PALMER PER SE RULE?
Per se rules are the result of sufficient judicial experience to condemn
those acts "that would always or almost always tend to restrict competi-
tion and decrease output. ' ' 236 It is rare that such conduct can be procom-
petitive or efficient, but we still find lower courts that try to differentiate
underlying facts to avoid using the per se rule. Per se rules have "the
same force and effect as any other statutory commands, '237 yet some
courts ignore or misconstrue clear per se edicts. When courts differenti-
ate or ignore a rule of law, are they being intellectually honest with those
the law is meant to protect? Should they instead be debating whether the
purposes of the per se rule are furthered by its application? After all, to
debate the substantive facts already condemned by a per se rule is to do
harm to the law and justice.
However, if the rule's application fails to improve judicial administra-
tion provide clarity to the business community, seems without economic
certainty, or offends the equitable administration of justice, 238 then per-
haps in that certain case the court can and should go beyond the law and
Eleventh Circuit decision. Id. at *25 (citing Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417,
1439 n.33 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U. .S. 46 (1990)). It did not even signal that it had
been reversed on other grounds. See id.
Another case that involved vertical restraints in bus station leasing and ticket agencies,
Pratt v. Indian Trails, Inc., No. 4:88-CV-2, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7908, at *26 (W.D. Mich.
June 11, 1991), cited the Eleventh Circuit opinion for the principle that, in a section 1 rule
of reason claim, the plaintiff must prove that defendants' agreement had an anticompeti-
tive effect in relevant geographic and product markets. As in the above case, it did not
even signal that opinion's summary reversal, however correct those suppositions cited may
be. Id.
235. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2717, 2720
(2007) (holding that vertical price restraints are no longer, after more than ninety-five
years, appropriate candidates for a per se analysis, but that (horizontal) cartels are, "and
ought to be, per se unlawful"). But see Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277
F.3d 499, 509-10 (4th Cir. 2002) (approving a district court's refusal to apply a per se analy-
sis where "precompetitive justifications" exist and its choice of an "abbreviated" rule of
reason analysis); Denny's Marina v. Renfro Prods., 8 F.3d 1217 (7th Cir. 1993) (reversing
an order for summary judgment where the district court refused to apply the per se rule
without first demonstrating "a substantial potential for impact on competition").
236. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
237. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990).
238. This does not necessarily mean justice between the parties, but justice between
cases.
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into the realm of fact finding. Such a debate avoids an uncertain body of
law and promotes justice and fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
In the 1990s a resurgence of per se analysis in antitrust was embodied
in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc. Horizontal price fixing and market
allocation claims, clearly seen as per se illegal by commentators, 239 were
badly mishandled by lower courts. Whether they were confused about
the law or acting for other reasons, the Supreme Court summarily re-
versed their decisions and revived the per se illegality of both categories.
In the following years of the 1990s, the lower courts continued to treat
horizontal price fixing and market allocation claims unevenly and with a
variety of analyses. The gains associated with a per se analysis-ease of
judicial administration, economic reliability, predictability, and the pro-
motion of justice-are not realized because some lower courts might not
employ per se analysis. The underlying premise of this historical sum-
mary is that, with the rejection of the ideology of deregulation, we may
soon see the relevance of a return to the pre-Bush years, including their
confusion in antitrust analysis.2 40
239. See Stephen Calkins, The October 1989 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Power,
Access, and Legitimacy, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 339, 354-55 (1991).
240. As has been confirmed in recent months, the deregulatory ideology associated
with the modern Republican Party (combined with the intensive litmus-testing of potential
judicial appointees to assure commitment to that ideology) has been partly responsible for
our recent economic collapse. Perhaps one answer is for Congress to legislate, as discretely
as possible, to add per se rule jurisprudence from cases like Palmer to section one of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The head of the Obama Administration's antitrust
division, Christine Varney, recently has announced that the Administration withdraws and
repudiates the Bush Administration's policies on single-firm conduct, just released in 2008.
This is a very promising development-suggesting the disavowal of ideology in antitrust
enforcement-for which Varney should be commended. See Stephen Labaton, Adminis-
tration Plans to Strengthen Antitrust Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/llbusiness/llantitrust.html.
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